Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Impossible World: possible worlds are determined by counterfactual descriptions, specifying conditions for the existence of objects or laws, or a listing of instanced properties. The existence of an impossible world is already excluded by the concept. However, an impossible world can e.g. be characterized by the fact that in it all propositions are true. Then, for an arbitrary sentence A applies A is true and non-A is true. Thus, existence is excluded for every object and property. See also possible worlds, modal logic, necessity, possibility, possible world semantics._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Stalnaker on Impossible World - Dictionary of Arguments
I 58 Contradiction/LewisVsImpossible World/Lewis: there is no object, no matter how fantastic, about which one could say the truth by contradicting oneself. >Existence, >Non-existence, >Contradictions. I 58 Impossible world/Stalnaker: problem: If the possible world is defined by a contradiction P and ~P, this contradiction is transmitted to the real world through the modal operator "in w, P" because it is then true in the real world that it is true in the other possible world. I 59 Another problem: if there is an impossible world, the possible world with P and those with ~P are no longer complements. >Complementarity. Problem: even the most bizarre possible world will not be at the same time in a set of possible worlds and its complement. I 62 Solution: new definition of impossible world: an impossible world is a world about which a contradiction is true. This does not makes the real world impossible. I 63 Impossible world/Actualism/Stalnaker: the actualist has no problems with an impossible world, because he/she can simply understand them as conflicting sets of propositions. >Actualism/Stalnaker. LewisVs/LewisVsErsatz world: conversely, propositions are sets of possible worlds. >ersatz world._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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> Counter arguments against Stalnaker
> Counter arguments in relation to Impossible World
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28